Philosophy and Multiculturalism: Searle, Rorty, and Taylor Essay

Philosophy and Multiculturalism Searle, Rorty, and Taylor swipe John Searle opposes multiculturalism because he views it as part of a movement to break the concepts of truth and objectivity in the Western tradition. Richard Rorty disagrees with Searle about the relation betwixt philosophic theories of truth and academic practices, but he is neutral on the eff of multiculturalism. Charles Taylor approaches the issue historically, defending multiculturalism as emerging from one offset printing of informal political theory. I argue that the debate over epistemic and political issues has tended to obscure the rearingal benefits of multiculturalism. A multicultural curriculum whole kit and boodle very well in fulfilling the traditional goals of education in philosophy. It give the sack assist the teacher as Socratic midwife and gadfly in delivering students from their narrow and uncritical opinions and awakening them to a world of sharp diversity. Thus, multiculturalism is non so much a recent movement as a new name for an old method of teaching. Philosophers have been slow to jointure the public debate on multiculturalism in spite of the important philosophical issues at stake. Notable exceptions are John Searle and Charles Taylor, who address the philosophical implications of the animosity over the curriculum in several recent essays. (1) Taylor defends multicultural education as a moral imperative of one branch of the liberal tradition, while Searle argues that a victory for multiculturalism would mean the destruction of the Western intellectual heritage. This paper will examine some of the arguments on both sides of the issue and propose an interpretation of multiculturalism as particularly significant for teaching philosophy.... ...Recognition, in Multiculturalism. Amy Gutmann, ed. (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25-73.(2) Rationality and Realism. . ., p. 69.(3) The Storm over the University, p. 112.(4) Richard Rorty, Does Academ ic Freedom Have philosophical Presuppositions Academic Freedom and the Future of the University, Academe (Nov.-Dec. 1994), p. 52.(5) Ibid., p. 61.(6) Rationality and Realism . . ., p. 71. (7) Richard Rorty, Hermeneutics, oecumenical Studies, and Teaching, Selected Papers from the Synergos Seminars, volume 2 (Fall, 1982), p. 112.(8) The Politics of Recognition, pp. 69-72.(9) Ibid., p. 66.(10) Ibid., p. 70.(11) Ibid., p. 73.(12) For an exception see Lawrence protect and Patricia Herzog, eds. Philosophical Perspectives on Pluralism and Multiculturalism (Amherst University of Massachusetts Press, 1994).